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During the 2012-2013 grant period, I used the Rockefeller Archive Center’s (RAC) 
generous grant-in-aid to develop my research on the efforts of the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) 
to modernize agriculture in Mexico during the early years of the cold war.  The aim of this 
research was to understand how the Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP) operated on the 
ground.  Most scholarship on this and other “green revolution” programs during the postwar era 
has taken executive-level planning and discourse as representing the actual efforts and their 
effects in local communities.  However, by reexamining the local interactions between scientists 
and other aid workers and their target communities, my work seeks to open up our understanding 
of the relations between so-called first and third world states in the cold war context. 
 The RF’s Mexican Agricultural Program began while WW II was still ramping up.  In 
1941, after Miguel Ávila Camacho was swept into the Mexican presidency with a mandate for 
development, and while the populist visions of the former president, Lázaro Cárdenas, were 
fading into memory, the top tiers of the Mexican government invited the RF down to help 
modernize Mexican agriculture.  For the Mexican officials, a modernized agricultural sector 
would be the necessary buttress to a new urban, industrial economy.  For its part, the RF had 
long considered an agricultural program as a way of branching out from its current work on 
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public health in Latin America and its leadership was already thinking that stepping up global 
agricultural production would be an imperative for global political stability once the gun smoke 
cleared.  With an agricultural program, RF officers thought, they could finally get a step ahead of 
Mexico’s entrenched underdevelopment, which the RF’s preexisting public health programs had 
scarcely affected.
1
  
 Success in the agricultural program was in some ways immediate and impressive.  Within 
a few short years of the RF’s arrival, Mexico achieved independence in its wheat consumption, 
and then, by 1955, it did the same for its primary staple, maize.  This was a first since before the 
Mexican Revolution (1911-1918).  During the early years of the cold war, Mexico’s “green 
revolution” became a model of rural development, and similar programs were created by the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the USAID in Colombia, Chile, Central 
America, the Philippines, and India.
2
  However, by the 1970s, and even more so in the 1980s, 
these programs came under increased criticism from academics as well as activists for many of 
the unforeseen or ignored social consequences of the modernization scheme.   
Following years of growing skepticism and distrust of science in the West and in many 
parts of the global south, and taking cues from the environmental movement, the critiques railed 
against the green revolution focused on the science.  Most renowned have been the writings of 
Indian scientist and activist Vandana Shiva, who calls the RF programs a type of “re-
colonization,” founded on objectifying, abstract and “de-contextualizing” science, that amounts 
to “a policy of planned destruction of diversity in nature and culture to create the uniformity 
demanded by centralized management systems.”3  Even more moderate critiques of the green 
revolution have emphasized how reliance on powerful technologies like dams, hybrid seeds, and 
chemical fertilizers all wreaked havoc on peasant way of life.  For more sympathetic writers, it is 
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a classic tale of hubris and too much faith in one’s own capacities.4 
 In academic writing, these and similar development programs are commonly 
characterized by historians as part of an era of high modernism.  Most notably, authors David 
Harvey and James Scott have noted the penchant of both well established and newly minted 
states to undertake massive, visionary and expensive projects of national revitalization and 
modernization. In Harvey’s terms, high modernism is defined by  
“the belief in linear progress, absolute truths, and rational planning of ideal social orders 
under standardized conditions of knowledge and production …  The modernism that 
resulted was … positivistic, technocratic, and rationalistic, at the same time as it was 
imposed as the work of an elite avant-garde of planners, artists, architects, critics …”5  
 
For those who study the targets (or the victims) of these national revitalization programs, it has 
become an academic commonplace to highlight such modernizers’ myopia, obsessiveness and 
megalomania and to demonstrate the great social costs and horrible catastrophes that followed in 
the wake of their conceits of modern agency.  Simply put, the scholarship has contrasted the 
abstract nature of modern planning to the non-abstract reality of lived life, with social violence 
resulting from the disjuncture between the two.  In exactly these terms, Nick Cullather, in his 
sweeping and powerful overview of postwar agricultural modernization programs, explains the 
costs often endured by the host communities of these efforts as the consequence of over-
confident planning. 
 However, as I have discovered at the RAC, although high modernism might accurately 
characterize the expectations of policymaking elites, for the technicians, academics, scientists, 
and humanitarians who dedicated their minds and lives to modernization, high modernism was 
already an intellectually unsupportable perspective.  By examining the scientific and intellectual 
process by which the RF pursued the modernization of Mexican agriculture in the early cold war, 
my work shows that positivism and overconfidence in technology had already been rejected by 
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the dominant intellectual trends in both science and mid-century liberalism.  Instead, the 
challenge of creating a pragmatic yet intellectually coherent program of modernization revolved 
around the problems of operating with an ecological perspective on both society and nature and 
the concomitant issue of managing an infinite number of variables.  Such an ecological and 
empirical perspective, however, proved unworkable.  Rather, over the course of the Mexican 
Agricultural Program (1943-1962), the problem of maintaining authority and control over the 
program resulted in RF officers retracting from a holistic perspective on their development 
schemes for rural Mexico, and instead, honing in their sights on what they saw to be the most 
hegemonic academic discipline, that is, genetics. 
 Among the RF officers and scientists who designed the MAP in the 1940s it was well- 
known that using the United States as a model for Mexico would be disastrous.  Not only would 
wantonly imposing American agricultural technology have unintended social consequences, but 
more importantly, these U.S. scientists knew that imported technologies would simply not work.  
By the time they arrived in Mexico, Mexican agronomists had already found quite decisively that 
the technologies widely and profitably used in North American—in particular, American hybrid 
seed—would not grow in Mexican soil.6  It was precisely for this reason that the RF thought that 
an empirical research program in Mexico would be necessary: if technologies could not be 
imported into Mexico, they had to be created anew using Mexico’s biological resources.   
 Except rather than thinking in narrowly scientific terms, MAP officers were very 
interested in the social dimensions of their science and technology.  They thought the most 
critical areas of intervention were improving the nation’s seed stock and advancing farming 
methods (the RF’s scientists especially abhorred the continued use of wooden plows).7 While 
their social and cultural considerations often included disparagement of Mexico’s “tradition 
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society” and dismay over its tenacity, they were, especially in the early years of the program, 
quite perceptive about why peasant farmers would not or could not use the newest technologies.  
Therefore, the RF agronomists attempted to imagine what technologies would work for peasants, 
such non-hybrid improved seeds.  Historian of science, Jonathan Harwood, has gone so far as to 
call these early ambitions of the MAP “peasant-friendly” technologies.8  Whether these were 
truly viable alternatives that would have saved peasants from the expansion of export agro-
industry is doubtful, but what is clear is that no high modern faith in the power of science 
reigned over the early program. 
 Although by the late 1950s this interest in the social ramifications of agricultural 
modernization faded from the RF’s vision.  Although American liberalism, the emerging 
scientific consensus on the idea of ecology, and the mainstream sociological thought, which the 
RF took very seriously, all emphasized the interconnectedness of science and culture, the MAP 
became a narrow scientific program.  As it turned out, the RF agents found that the social and 
cultural dimensions of their work were too politically vulnerable, and this meant that authority 
over the program would be compromised by including a social program.  Thus by the 1960s, as 
the RF agents were preparing to close shop and hand their resources to their Mexican 
counterparts, and as the MAP was serving as a model for other parts of the globe, the architects 
of the program saw it more strictly in terms of advancing the most high-tech and instrumental 
technologies.  Although it did not begin that way, the MAP took on the familiar shape of high 
modernism.  
 Against the better judgment of their intellectual traditions, the leadership of the MAP 
eschewed a broader vision and adopted the perspective of technological determinism.  To 
understand this transformation, I examined at the RAC the intellectual and empirical 
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underpinnings of agricultural science as the RF saw it.  My purpose was to demonstrate that mid-
century natural sciences, at least as practiced by the RF, provided no reason to believe that 
technology gave humans any unconditional power over nature, or that technology could be 
recklessly transferred from one place to another and expected to work.  Rather, ecological ideas 
about nature tempered any untoward faith in science.  During this same period, the notion of 
ecology was migrating from the biological sciences into the social sciences, and this, as well, 
greatly affected RF programming.  However, this notion of social holism and concomitant ideas 
about social complexity created both epistemic and organizational problems for the RF.  These 
troubles left vulnerable disciplinary and programming boundaries that threatened the RF’s 
control over its project.  For these reasons, in the 1950s, after a decade in Mexico, the MAP shed 
its intellectual responsibility for the social ramifications of modernization and began to think of 
itself as only responsible for technical matters.  
 However, the intellectual life of the United States was not all that shaped by this 
program, which would go on to inspire many cold war projects.  If ever there was a moment 
when these ideas about social complexity and the “science of philanthropy” might have led to a 
thoroughly integrated social and scientific program of agricultural modernization, it was in the 
early 1950s.  By this time, the MAP had been in Mexico a decade and generally the RF officers 
felt quite proud of the program thus far.  The 1952 national elections disrupted this calm by 
bringing into office a different Minister of Agriculture, Gilberto Flores Muñoz, who had 
ambitious plans for a new National Emergency Agricultural Extension Program to rapidly 
develop the agriculture sector with one big push.
9
  
Since the beginning of the MAP extension service had been a cornerstone of the program, 
along with research and the training of competent Mexican agronomists.  When in 1941, the RF  
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first assessed how the MAP should distribute its attention, the board of trustees agreed with the 
technical advisors that once proper technologies were advanced, then an extension program 
would follow.
10
  In 1948, the MAP had a number of improved seeds they felt pretty good about, 
and they knew how to successfully grow in the Mexican climate, and as a result a meager 
extension project was begun.  However, while there was a growing sense that it was time for a 
massive extension effort, this program remained quite minor.
11
  Flores Muñoz’s ambition seemed 
the perfect opportunity to bring the whole program to fruition.  While the RF joined in the 
extension service, Secretary Flores Muñoz maintained tight control over the effort, ceding little 
power to the Americans, both for the cause of nationalism and his own career.  As a consequence 
the MAP scientists functioned largely as scientific experts and were excluded from the social 
aspects of extension efforts.  Intellectually, this inspired the MAP to theorize their modernization 
program in congruent terms and it led to a structural reorganization to reflect this newly defined 
mission. 
 Further research is needed to assess just how and to what extent the transformations at the 
MAP translated into other, similar development efforts of the early cold war.  Subsequent 
programs in South America and Asia undertaken by the RF and other foundations, and by the 
U.S. State Department throughout the 1960s and 1970s, drew experience and personnel from the 
MAP.  Additional research is needed in Mexican archives as well, to elaborate on how Mexican 
political developments affected the RF and ideologies of development during these critical years.  
Such research—transnational and multi-archival—will deepen our understanding of the nature of 
American soft power in the American century. 
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Editor's Note: This research report is presented here with the author’s permission but should not be cited 
or quoted without the author’s consent.  
Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports Online is a periodic publication of the Rockefeller 
Archive Center. Edited by Erwin Levold, Research Reports Online is intended to foster the network of 
scholarship in the history of philanthropy and to highlight the diverse range of materials and subjects 
covered in the collections at the Rockefeller Archive Center. The reports are drawn from essays submitted 
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The ideas and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and are not intended to 
represent the Rockefeller Archive Center. 
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